



# “SHOW ME YOUR PAPERS”: A DEEP DIVE INTO THE DANGEROUS 287(G) TASK FORCE MODEL

A breakdown of the most expansive 287(g) agreement and how it wholly transforms law enforcement officers into immigration agents.

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## I. INTRODUCTION: A BRIEF HISTORY OF 287(G) AND THE TASK FORCE MODEL

The Trump administration is determined to radically transform every law enforcement agency (LEA) in the United States—local, county, state, and federal—into cogs in a sweeping immigration enforcement machine. What was once the purview of federal agents is becoming the day to day activity of police officers, through the proliferation of 287(g) agreements. Through 287(g) agreements, ICE is extending its arm deep into communities, threatening everyday life in neighborhoods across the country. With that extended reach comes a new expansion of well-documented harms: rampant racial profiling, overpolicing of historically targeted communities, and the rollback of police reforms aimed at transparency and accountability.

[Section 287\(g\)](#) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) authorized the creation of a program that allows state and local LEAs to act as immigration enforcement agents. Under 287(g), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) forms an agreement with a state or local agency (most commonly with a county sheriff that runs a local jail). Depending on the type, the 287(g) agreement outsources some of ICE’s federal immigration enforcement authority to specific law enforcement officers within the local agency. There are currently [three types of 287\(g\) model agreements](#),



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all of which are harmful to communities nationwide. Nonetheless, the agreements vary in the degree and scope of delegated authority: the Warrant Service Officer Model (WSO), the Jail Enforcement Model (JEM), and the Task Force Model (TFM). Born out of the 1996 [overhaul of U.S. immigration law](#), 287(g) agreements did not grow in popularity until the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks and the formation of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

The second Trump administration’s full-throated expansion of the 287(g) program has attained unprecedented, exponential levels in reach and scope. A February 2026 [ACLU report](#) found that at least 77.2 million people in the United States, or 32 percent of the country, are now living in a county with a law enforcement agency that has enlisted in one of the three 287(g) models. Discussed in more detail below, the Task Force Model was and still is known as the most dangerous and all-encompassing agreement a law enforcement agency can enter into with ICE. More LEAs are now operating under the 287(g) Task Force Model than the other two models combined. As of [April 27, 2026](#), ICE has 1,070 Task Force Model agreements with agencies in 32 states and 2 U.S. territories, as compared to 497 Warrant Service Officer Model agreements in 35 states and 177 Jail Enforcement Model agreements in 30 states and 1 U.S. territory. With no signs of slowing down, the Trump administration will continue to blanket communities with its immigration enforcement dragnet—and worse, with the most treacherous form of 287(g) agreement available: the Task Force Model.

In the late 2000s and early 2010s, the Task Force Model raised immediate concerns with advocates and community members, who feared the agreements would lead to unlawful arrests and detentions and exacerbate the racial profiling of Black and Brown communities and other racialized communities already subject to discriminatory policing practices. These fears materialized over time: past U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) investigations found that 287(g) programs in local jurisdictions [resulted in widespread racial profiling](#). Significant and sustained immigrant justice organizing and power building in communities nationwide, paired with high-profile



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investigations into racial profiling practices in 287(g) jurisdictions, led to the Obama administration [discontinuing all Task Force Model agreements](#) in December 2012. After a brief nadir, 287(g) [agreements again rose in number](#) during the first Trump administration, associated with the [targeting of sheriffs departments](#) by far-right and anti-immigrant movements, and in the second Trump administration the number of 287(g) agreements has skyrocketed.

Previously, 287(g) agreements required local LEAs to do ICE's work to target and harm communities for them, at the expense of the local agency and taxpayers. In many cases, LEAs having to foot the bill for doing extra immigration work served as a deterrent—why should local police take on additional duties and split their time? In this new era, the Trump administration has created perverse incentives for local jurisdictions. Through [H.R. 1](#), also known as the One Big Beautiful Bill Act, local LEAs can be reimbursed for the costs associated with 287(g) agreements and other enforcement activities. Paired with the growth of state laws, like those passed in Florida and Texas which mandate that agencies assist with immigration enforcement and require 287(g) agreements, these combined efforts have spelled disaster for immigrants and people of color nationwide. Nonetheless, there are ways communities and allies can resist and mitigate harm, even when under state 287(g) mandates.

## **II. DEEP DIVE: THE TASK FORCE MODEL'S DANGERS**

### ***CARTE BLANCHE FOR RACIAL PROFILING AND CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS***

The Task Force Model is the [broadest 287\(g\)](#) agreement currently available, and has already been proven to provide carte blanche for rampant racial profiling, unbridled civil rights abuses, and little to no federal oversight as determined by the DHS [Office of Inspector General](#) in 2018 and the [Government Accountability Office](#) in 2021. Past and recent news reporting [finds the Task Force Model](#), and all 287(g) models, to be a breeding ground for community harm and a lack of accountability. Under the Task Force Model agreement, deputized local or state officers can:



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- Screen and interrogate anyone (detained or not) who they suspect lacks lawful immigration status;
- Arrest any immigrant without a warrant for violations of immigration law or for certain immigration-related felonies;
- Serve and execute arrest (“administrative warrants”) or removal warrants;
- Check the immigration status of detainees;
- Take and maintain custody of immigrants arrested by ICE;
- Issue immigration detainers (requests from ICE to LEAs to hold detainees for up to 48 hours before transfer to an ICE facility) to other agencies;
- Take biometrics and conduct evidentiary interviews;
- Prepare affidavits, sworn statements, arrest reports, and charging documents for ICE use; and
- Transfer detainees to ICE facilities.

LEAs who enter into a 287(g) agreement must complete a [Memorandum of Agreement](#) (“MOA”), which lays out the scope, terms, and conditions of how they will partner with ICE. Only some officers chosen by the head of the local or state LEA will be deputized under the Task Force Model agreement, with ICE’s approval, and only those officers are authorized to enforce immigration law. Deputized officers must be U.S. citizens and have at least two years of law enforcement experience. Immigration law is notoriously complex, even for seasoned attorneys, immigration judges, and federal judges with decades of experience-not to mention the complicated impact of the second [Trump administration’s takeover](#) of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which creates immigration law precedent. Immigration law is in constant flux. Meanwhile, training for deputized Task Force officers is currently reduced to just 40 online hours. Previously, training took place in-person at the Federal Law Enforcement



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Training Center. ICE may require supplemental training, but it is not required to do so. ICE may assign these officers to various task forces once they are deputized; however, these officers must balance their regular duties and their additional ICE responsibilities.

The [template Task Force MOA](#) still indicates that 287(g) operations are carried out entirely at the participating agency's expense. However, ICE will pay the costs of installing software or terminals for 287(g) officers to access federal DHS databases to obtain immigration records and carry out enforcement investigations. As discussed below, [ICE has proposed](#) sweeping reimbursement incentives for participating 287(g) agencies, and early data reveals massive payouts to local and state LEAs. Further, 287(g) officers must be supervised by ICE agents closely—though it is unclear how often that supervision happens in reality. The MOA states that 287(g) officers may only enforce immigration law as supervised or directed by ICE, and must contact ICE supervisors for guidance during or after exercising delegated immigration authority. Additionally, 287(g) officers must follow DHS and ICE policies and procedures, unless they conflict with local rules or state law. Details are few about how this attenuated chain of command operates logistically.

By signing the MOA, 287(g) agencies agree not to release any 287(g) operational information without coordinating with ICE. Nonetheless, a provision in a contract with ICE does not relieve LEAs from their obligation to release information under state open records laws—meaning that LEAs must still abide by state law when asked to turn over information about their 287(g) operations. If a 287(g) officer is sued under federal law for immigration enforcement activities, they are treated like federal agents for the purposes of immunity and liability—as in, the federal government would be found liable if a court finds a 287(g) officer violated federal law. The DOJ may, but does not have to, represent 287(g) officers in court.

As for federal civil rights obligations, the MOA glosses over these, stating 287(g) officers are bound by all applicable federal civil rights statutes and regulations.



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However, 287(g) officers must “provide an opportunity” for immigrants who do not speak English to request an interpreter, and the agency will provide one—presumably at the agency’s expense. There are no further details about this requirement.

The MOA provides for a complaint procedure against 287(g) officers, which must be communicated to the public by the 287(g) agency in English and “other languages as appropriate.” Complaints received locally will be forwarded to ICE’s Office of Professional Responsibility (“OPR”). From there, if OPR decides it has jurisdiction over the complaint, it is forwarded onwards to be resolved internally within 90 days—a form of agency self-investigation. Purportedly, if a 287(g) officer is the subject of a complaint that could result in professional discipline or legal action, they must be removed from 287(g) designation until the complaint is resolved and they may be suspended or otherwise disciplined under local policies. Officers authorized under 287(g) agreements will be notified of the results of the complaint process, but members of the public who filed the complaint do not receive any notification or update. ICE, and DHS as a whole, have been plagued by insufficient oversight and a lack of accountability long before either Trump administration. Nonetheless, the second Trump administration [has dismantled many of the traditional avenues](#) for reporting misconduct or illegal activity. As [noted in whistleblower testimony](#) and other reporting, the likelihood of robust internal oversight of 287(g) complaints at ICE—and any punitive action—is extremely low.

Notably, all semblance of “community engagement” on 287(g) issues is gone. Previously, ICE required interested LEAs to complete a bare-bones [Needs Assessment](#), to “collect information about immigration enforcement challenges in your community” prior to entering into a 287(g) agreement. It is not clear whether any LEA during the second Trump administration has been required to complete this form, or if so, whether ICE is meaningfully weighing this information in its decisionmaking. Further, stakeholders historically had the opportunity to share feedback with ICE on 287(g) programs through communication with a [287\(g\) Steering Committee](#).



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This outlet seems to be defunct. The swiftness with which ICE is boasting of new 287(g) agreements belies the idea that ICE would conduct needs assessments or any community engagement before turning every LEA possible into an arm of federal immigration enforcement.

### ***FUNDING INCENTIVES***


Unlike past iterations of the 287(g) program, in which LEAs paid the lion's share of the costs of participation and had to divert resources from their everyday duties, DHS is making participation extremely lucrative for agencies. DHS is offering "[reimbursement opportunities](#)" for agencies that sign up to join "supercharged" enforcement efforts with ICE. The Trump administration claims it will fully reimburse agencies for the annual salary and benefits of each "eligible trained 287(g) officer, including overtime coverage." To date, there is no publicly available data tracking reimbursement to LEAs. Agencies may also qualify for "quarterly monetary performance awards" based on how many immigrants they locate, ranging between \$500 and \$1,000 per deputized officer. These monetary incentives are provided for by H.R. 1's funding for "state and local participation" in immigration enforcement efforts. Provisions in H.R. 1 also provide funding for the DOJ to establish grant programs for state agencies who criminally investigate, prosecute, and detain immigrants who are unlawfully present and who have allegedly committed crimes.

[Internal ledger data](#) on ICE's funding incentives reveal enormous payouts for more than [400 LEAs across the country](#), with Florida and Texas leading the way. In Florida, ICE has paid or pledged to pay 120 LEAs a gargantuan sum of \$149,917,510 between September 2025 and March 2026. Multiple police departments in Florida have been promised upwards of \$1 million, while the Lee County Police Department was paid \$2,835,000 in February 2026, and the Saint John's County Police Department is set to receive \$5,197,500. Staggeringly, ICE has pledged more than \$89,000,000 to the Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles Highway Patrol to participate in 287(g). In Texas, ICE has paid or pledged to pay 83 local LEAs a total of \$13,195,000



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between September 2025 and March 2026. One LEA alone—the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office—is slated to receive \$630,000 at an unknown date. In contrast to these immigration enforcement windfalls, community needs in Florida and Texas continue to go unmet. The poverty rate in Florida and Texas at 12 percent and 13.4 percent respectively, per



the latest Census data. In Texas alone, 6.4 percent of residents [live in deep poverty](#), often choosing between paying for food, housing, healthcare, or transportation, and Black and Hispanic Texans are disproportionately impacted by poverty and its causes. Texas also has the [highest uninsured rate](#) in the nation, with almost 17 percent of residents living without health insurance.

[According to the ACLU](#), the details of ICE’s funding incentives are sinister: for example, ICE offered the Dallas Police Department \$25 million to join 287(g) if it detained 50 people a day, although Dallas refused. The ACLU characterizes these incentives [as effective bribery](#); what is clear is that ICE has never before made immigration enforcement as financially attractive as it is now for beleaguered LEAs looking for a budgetary boost. Communities nationwide will be endangered if their local LEAs are tempted by these immensely lucrative offers to participate in immigration enforcement.

### **BRANCHING OUT: THE TRIBAL TASK FORCE MODEL**

Alarming, in 2026, DHS’s [287\(g\) website](#) briefly included a “[Tribal Task Force Model](#)” described as “a force multiplier for tribal LEAs to enforce limited immigration authority with ICE oversight under Title 25 USC 2804.” While the Tribal Task Force Model was



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featured on the website, there was no fillable sample agreement available, nor were any tribal LEAs listed as participants. Further, it was not clear whether new funding incentives and grants created to lure LEAs into 287(g) agreements, described in full below, would apply to tribal governments and law enforcement jurisdictions. During the second Trump administration's recent deployment of immigration and other federal agents targeting Somali communities in Minnesota, a number of [Oglala Sioux members were arrested by ICE](#)—the latest among other reported arrests of Native Americans nationwide by immigration authorities. Reports indicate that many tribal members of various nations in other states are rushing to acquire tribal identification (IDs), with [one expert](#) stating this is the first time tribal IDs have been “widely used as proof of U.S. citizenship and protection against federal law enforcement.” Other Native organizers are calling on legacies of resistance and [issuing guidance](#) to protect both tribe members and communities at large. Needless to say, the addition—however brief—of the “Tribal Task Force Model” signaled an unprecedented escalation in the Trump administration's insistence on a full-scale attack on all communities of color.

### ***AN UPDATE ON TEXAS'S LEGISLATIVE MANDATE AND MORE***

The ILRC has covered the [rapid expansion of 287\(g\)](#) agreements and state legislative mandates requiring them. In June 2025, Texas passed [SB 8](#), legislation that mandated 287(g) agreements with [234 out of the state's 254 counties](#) and created a state-administered grant program for participating agencies. Obligated counties must comply with the law by December 1, 2026. The Texas state comptroller must submit a biennial report documenting the total number of participating sheriffs and money distributed under the grant program. This report will serve as a comprehensive state-level accounting of compliance with SB 8.

As of the end of February 2026, Texas had entered into almost [300 active 287\(g\) agreements across 186 counties](#). Of these agreements, 117 are Task Force Model agreements. According to the Texas Policy Institute, “SB 8 did not create 287(g) participation in Texas. It institutionalized it. The numbers now show that Texas is not



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simply participating. It is leading.” In late 2025, prior to SB 8’s official effective date of January 1, 2026, the Texas Department of Public Safety (“DPS”) signed a pair of Task Force Model 287(g) agreements that [deputized some state police](#) within DPS’s Criminal Investigations and Highway Patrol divisions to enforce immigration law. Per the Texas Observer, this move marked a “sea change” in 287(g) agreements in Texas, as DPS employs nearly 5,000 commissioned officers as opposed to much smaller county sheriff’s offices. Local [reporting notes](#) that even prior to DPS’s Task Force Model agreement, it had been “helping [federal agents] apprehend undocumented immigrants with no criminal record across the state” in multiple joint operations.

Encouragingly, a handful of states have chosen to move in the opposite direction in 2026: [New Mexico](#) and [Maryland](#) recently banned all 287(g) agreements and Virginia’s new [Governor Abigail Spanberger](#) rescinded all active prior 287(g) agreements with state agencies via executive order. A growing number of states [restrict or limit 287\(g\)](#) agreement participation via [state law or policy](#): California, Connecticut, [Delaware](#), Illinois, Maine, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington

### III. RECOMMENDATIONS

Advocates in states with 287(g) mandates in place, and those gearing up for resisting similar efforts, can take steps to mitigate harm and deescalate damage to their communities. Most important is to remain well informed of exactly what types of immigration enforcement support your state legislature has mandated and which state jurisdictions are required to comply. Some municipalities and other local political units are exempt from 287(g) mandates depending on how the relevant legislation was formulated. Ensuring you are well informed of the legal requirements is critical when entering into conversations or negotiations with local policymakers and LEAs about compliance.

For those jurisdictions with LEAs who are already under clear state 287(g) mandates, advocates should work together to develop possible 287(g) strategies to reduce



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harm, and should reach out to similarly-situated advocates elsewhere to learn from successful efforts to minimize compliance with mandates. Unfortunately, advocates are often also tasked with providing extensive education to LEAs and local elected officials about the different 287(g) models, as ICE frequently misrepresents or provides misleading information about how each model operates and their respective impacts on communities. It is equally important for advocacy groups themselves to develop a thorough understanding of each model—ideally in partnership with legal organizations—and to share documented reports and data demonstrating the harms of 287(g) in nearby localities or states.

For affected community members and organizations, look to community reporting tools that help collect data about how 287(g) is showing up locally, tracking incidents and which law enforcement agents are involved. One example, hosted by [Texans United for Justice](#), hosts an online intake form in English and Spanish, where community members can report local incidents to be used anonymously by organizations when advocating with policymakers. Similar community reporting tools feature a map of incidents and areas for vulnerable community members to avoid that may be under 287(g) agreements. These maps and alerts can be circulated on [social media](#) and through local networks to raise awareness. Advocates and community members can also submit requests for information under each state's [public records law](#) about the extent of a local agency's partnership with ICE under the 287(g) agreement. In certain cases, an agency's lack of or inadequate response to a public information request could even lead to litigation that may prove useful in future advocacy. State-specific toolkits for [public information requests](#), like this one for [Texas](#), can also bolster local advocacy. Resisting the tidal wave of 287(g) agreements, and especially the increasingly widespread use of the dangerous Task Force Model, will take a persistent, all-community response—but it can be done.

**For more information about 287(g) agreements, please visit:**

**<https://www.ilrc.org/practitioners/national-map-287g-agreements>**